



Programme

International Colloquium

Theme: Applications of Conversational Thinking

**Keynote Lecturer/5th CSP DALs: Professor C.K. Raju, Indian
Institute of Advanced Studies**

Hosted at

Center for Interdisciplinary and Intercultural Studies, Eberhard Karls
University of Tübingen, Germany [Online, link to be supplied later]

Date: May 13 & 14, 2021

Overview

As more scholars in different places are beginning to apply the method of conversational thinking as a decolonial approach to research in the humanities, it has become necessary to convene a colloquium of such scholars to motivate collaborations, interdisciplinarity, interculturality and advancement of the method. To this end, DR Jonathan Okeke Chimakonam of University of Pretoria, South Africa and a fellow at the Center for Interdisciplinary and Intercultural Studies, Eberhard Karls University of Tubingen, Germany, is organising and hosting a two-day colloquium on **Applications of Conversational Thinking** as a decolonial method in the humanities. The colloquium would bring together researchers to brainstorm and work out ways of closer cooperation and collaborations. The outcome of the colloquium will be published in a special issue of *Arumaruka: Journal of Conversational Thinking*. The colloquium will be opened with a keynote by Prof CK Raju of the Indian Institute of Education.

For more on the CSP and her activities, visit: <https://cspafrica.org/>

List of Participants

1. Prof CK Raju---Keynote Speaker, India
2. Prof Fainos Mangena, Zimbabwe
3. Dr Joyline Gwara, Zimbabwe
4. Dr Christiana Idika, Frankfurt, Germany
5. Mr Victor Nweke, Koblenz, Germany
6. Dr Aribiah Attoe, Wits, South Africa
7. Dr L. Uchenna Ogbonnaya, Pretoria, South Africa
8. Ms Diana Ofana, Fort Hare, South Africa
9. Ms Amara Chimakonam, Johannesburg, South Africa
10. Mr Lindokhule Shabane, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa
11. Dr Uchenna Ezeogu, Okerenkoko, Nigeria
12. Dr Maduka Enyimba, Calabar, Nigeria
13. Dr Isaiah Negedu, Lafia, Nigeria & Natal, South Africa
14. Mr Emmanuel Ofuasia, LASU, Nigeria
15. Dr Leyla T-Haidarian, Austria
16. Dr Yvette Freter, Tennessee, USA

Programme of Events

Day One

Opening by the Convenor of the Conversational Society of Philosophy, Dr Jonathan Chimakonam (8.45 – 9.00).

Keynote/CSP 5th DALs Lecture by Prof C. K. Raju, titled: **“Euclid” must fall: The “Pythagorean” “Theorem” and the Rant of Racist and Civilizational Superiority** (9.00-10.00).

Colloquium presentation by Dr Yvette Freter, titled: **Philosophical (Mis)Appropriation: A Philosopher of Education considers the Stealing, Borrowing, Sharing, and Creating of African Philosophy** (10.05 – 10.35).

Colloquium presentation by Dr Joyline Gwara, titled: **Reason and Emotion as Binaries in the Conceptual Analysis of Masculinity in African Philosophy** (10.40 – 11.10).

Colloquium presentation by Dr Lucky Uchenna Ogbonnaya, titled: **Applying Conversational Thinking on the Problem of Xenophobia in Multicultural Societies** (11.15 – 11.45).

BREAK (11.45-12.30)

Colloquium presentation by Diana Ekor, titled: **An Application of Conversational Thinking to the Problem of Racial Discrimination in South Africa** (12.30 – 13.00).

Colloquium Presentation by Emmanuel Ofuasia, titled: **On the Distinction between Friedrich Hegel's Dialectics and the Logic of Conversational Thinking** (13.05 – 13.35).

Colloquium presentation by Dr Leyla Tavernaro-Haidaria, titled: **Applications of Conversational Thinking: The Role of Collective Action in Merging Contexts** (13.40 – 14.10).

Colloquium presentation by Dr Aribiah Attoe, titled: **How can we Overcome the Problem of Conversationund in Applying Conversational Thinking** (14.15 – 14.35).

Day Two

Colloquim presentation by Dr Isaiah Negedu, titled: **Decolonising Method in the Age of Transdisciplinarity: A Case for Conversational Thinking** (9.00 – 9.30).

Colloquium presentation by Amara Esther Chimakonam, titled: **Transhumanism in Africa: A Conversation with Fayemi on his Afrofuturistic account of Personhood** (9.35 – 10.05).

Colloquium presentation by Prof Fainos Mangena, titled: **Ubuntu as Conversational: A Case of the Common Moral Position** (10.10 – 10.40).

Colloquium presentation by Dr Uchenna A Ezeogu, titled: **African Philosophy Beyond Eurocentric Concepts and Categories: A Conversational Discourse** (10.45 – 10.15).

BREAK (10.15 – 11.00)

Colloquium Presentation by Lindokhule Shabane, titled: **Conversations with Kwasi Wiredu: why conceptual decolonization must adopt conversational thinking** (11.00 – 11.30).

Colloquium presentation by Enyimba Maduka, titled: **Conversational Ethical Principles as Roadmap to Good Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa** (11.35 – 12.05).

Colloquium presentation by Victor Nweke, titled: **A Conversation on the Keg and Trademark of Humanity** (12.10 – 12.40)

Colloquium presentation by Dr Christiana Idika, titled: **TBC** (12.45 – 13.15)

Closing remarks/vote of thanks by the Convenor of the Conversational Society of Philosophy, Dr Jonathan Chimakonam (13.15-13.30)

Book of Abstracts

KEYNOTE: “Euclid” must fall: The “Pythagorean” “theorem” and the rant of racist and civilizational superiority

C. K. Raju

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Extended Abstract

The origin and evolution of the dogma of racist superiority is analysed: it arose from an earlier dogma of religious superiority, and further mutated into the dogma of civilizational superiority which accompanied colonialism, and still persists, for example, as part of current mathematics teaching. The same false history of science, with minor variations, was used to provide the secular justification for all three claims of superiority, which are hence organically linked.

Systematically false history was first used by the church as a psychological weapon, ever since the fifth century Orosius. During the Crusades this false history went ballistic. Many Arabic texts were captured by or imported into the Christian parts of Europe at this time, but the origin of all scientific knowledge in these Arabic texts was indiscriminately attributed to the early Greeks, real or imaginary, then regarded as the sole “friends of Christians” (religious superiority), later as Whites (racist superiority), and finally as West (civilizational superiority). While the use of the genocidal “dogma of Christian discovery” to appropriate land (three whole continents), and to appropriate labor (by morally/legally justifying slavery of Blacks), is somewhat understood, its use to appropriate indigenous scientific knowledge (e.g. “Copernicus discovered heliocentricity”, “Newton discovered calculus”), and erect a false history of science, is very little understood. Consequently, any attempt to fight racist superiority would be fruitless, without simultaneously contesting the claim of civilizational superiority, for which it is first necessary to demolish the related false history of science.

A key aspect of this false history of science is the false claim that the Greek Pythagoras proved a theorem, unknown to early Egyptians, Maya, Indians etc. This false history is tied to a bad philosophy: through the claim that the West invented a civilizationally “superior” form of mathematics—formal mathematics—which too everyone else ought to imitate, as school children are currently taught to do throughout the world. (In reality, the early Greeks were superstitious, and could not have done any science also because they were pitifully backward in mathematics, as established by the non-textual evidence of their laughably inferior calendar. That inferiority arose from ignorance of elementary fractions, an ignorance which persisted into the 16th c., as evidenced from the inferior Gregorian calendar in current use worldwide.)

Regarding Pythagoras, there is nil evidence either for his existence or for the claim that he proved some kind of geometric theorem. This is not mere absence of evidence, there

is ample *counter* evidence that Pythagoreans were *not* interested in formal proofs of theorems, but were interested in geometry (Egyptian mystery geometry), solely because of its religious connections, as described by Plato.

Western historians try to “save the story” using the technique of myth jumping: the myth of Pythagoras is defended by jumping to another myth, the myth of “Euclid” as “evidence”. There is, however, no primary evidence either for “Euclid”, or that he authored the text today attributed to him, or that the text was written anywhere near the date attributed to “Euclid”, or that the author was a white male. Once again, there is ample counter evidence, that the book *Elements* was authored by another person, 700 years after the purported date of Euclid, that she was a black woman from Alexandria, in Africa, and that she authored the book because of the religious connection of its geometry to the soul, involving a notion of the soul which was at just that time cursed and banned by the church.

When the myth of Euclid collapses, Western historians try to “save the story” by jumping to the myth of the book purportedly written by Euclid. According to the myth, the key feature of the book is its supposed use of “superior” axiomatic proofs (as distinct from empirical proofs accepted in all other cultures). Under church hegemony, all Western scholars gullibly believed this myth for seven centuries, without carefully reading the actual book. However, at the end of the 19th century, when church hegemony waned, it was pointed out by Dedekind, Russell, and Hilbert that the myth is false: the book does not have a single formal proof in it, from its first proposition to its last. In fact, the most superficial reading of the book shows that it is full of diagrams which are irrelevant to formal proof, but are a characteristic feature of Egyptian mystery geometry. This points to the religious geometry of the book, as explicitly explained by Proclus.

In fact, the book, when it first came to the Christian part of Europe, around 1125, was just brazenly “reinterpreted” by the church in support of its Crusading “theology of reason”, which required metaphysical (axiomatic) reasoning (prohibiting the use of facts which are fatal to church dogmas).

It is over a century since the myth that the “Euclid” *book* has has axiomatic proofs was publicly exposed as false. Amazingly, however, Western historians like Needham, Gillings, and Clagett, will still not read the book, but keep re-asserting the myth that there are axiomatic proofs in the book, and offer this false myth as a sure proof of Western civilizational superiority! This qualifies them for the title of “Greedidiots”, people who steadfastly ignore facts, and stick to church and racist myths about Greeks. This applies also to Lefkowitz, who in *Not of Africa*, tries to save the myth of Greek origins by advancing mathematically laughable claims.

More importantly, however, though they rejected the *myth* of axiomatic proofs in “Euclid”, Russell and Hilbert along with all other Western scholars, kept believing in the *superstition* that axiomatic proofs are “superior” to empirical proofs. This purported mathematical “superiority” was never publicly debated, just as racist superiority was never publicly debated.

Actually, a mathematically proved formal theorem is INFERIOR, since it may not even be valid knowledge. For example, the Pythagorean theorem is NOT valid knowledge for triangles drawn on the curved surface of the earth, or for that matter anywhere in curved space (with the sides of the triangle being straight lines or the shortest distance between two points). It is a bad defence to say the theorem is “actually” an approximation: first the purported superiority of a “theorem” arises from the claim that it is exact knowledge, so this claim of “exact” knowledge, and the related claim of “superiority” must first be publicly trashed. Secondly, an approximation is of no use without an error estimate, and the theorem provides no estimate of the error (since it pretends to be exact knowledge). That a mere theorem is inferior knowledge came out clearly in the persistent navigational problem of

Europe from the 16th to the 18th century, resulting in the loss of thousands of lives. As such, the two “Pythagorean” *calculations*, as used in ancient India (and probably also in ancient Egypt and Iraq) are superior, as I have earlier explained.

In fact, contrary to the church superstition that deduction is infallible, formal deductive proofs (minus facts) are certainly fallible: everyone from students to authorities can and does turn in erroneous formal proofs. The only way to validate these proofs is to check them repeatedly (induction) or else to rely on authority; in either case deductive proofs are MORE fallible than inductive or empirical proofs. The game of chess demonstrates that errors in a complex task of deduction occur very frequently (almost always), so that deductive proofs are inferior to empirical proofs.

To do away with the persistence of racism, and the related sticky claims of civilizational superiority, it is necessary to cleanse the minds of our children by revising both the teaching of history of science as also the teaching of mathematics in schools. This is not mere wishful thinking, concrete courses have been tried out and successfully tested both at the school and university level, in both the history and philosophy of science, and in alternative teaching of mathematics. Even a school text has been prepared on string geometry, as traditionally used in both India and Africa.

The question now is solely of the political willingness of the colonized to confront the West, over its racist beliefs, which will not go away without a reform of the church education system brought by colonialism.

Philosophical (Mis)Appropriation: A philosopher of education considers the stealing, borrowing, sharing, and creating of African philosophy

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Cultural appropriation has made it into the mainstream media and in recent years has become a topic of debate for general audiences¹. However, as scholarship in Western philosophy finally (re)turns its gaze to Africa, only little work has been done by western scholars² regarding how to avoid re-enacting the plundering of our colonial past. A year such as 1960 represents the burgeoning (re)affirmation of African independence, but can we truly honor the *Year of Africa* seventy years later by honoring her philosophy and incorporating it into

¹ See for instance George Chesterton, ‘Cultural appropriation: everything is culture and it’s all appropriated’, GQ, 15. January 2019 (<https://www.gq-magazine.co.uk/article/the-trouble-with-cultural-appropriation>) or Marian Lu, Washington Post, 30. October 2019, ‘A culture, not a costume. How to handle cultural appropriation during Halloween’ (<https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/10/30/culture-not-costume/>). (<https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/10/30/culture-not-costume/>).

² There are, of course, exceptions, for instance, in philosophical regards, Robert Bernasconi, ‘Kant as an Unfamiliar Source of Racism’. In: *Philosophers on Race. Critical Essays*, edited by J. K. Ward, T. L. Lott. Oxford et al.: Blackwell, 2002, 145-166 or Robert Bernasconi and Sybol Cook, *Race and Racism in Continental Philosophy*. Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2003 or, in sociological regards

our practices? This paper will consider from the lens of a white African euro-western philosopher of education if, in the process of multiracial community building, whiteness can be decentered³ in a process that is not stealing or borrowing⁴, but the sharing and perhaps even the creation of new philosophical work such as a transactional evolving philosophy of education⁵ to inform the educational spaces of Africa and beyond. The author will consider a philosophy of education that is non-hierarchical and non-superioristic through utilizing a relational epistemological approach that fosters such knowledge construction and will consider the global applications of such a philosophy in classroom spaces.

Reason and Emotion as Binaries in the Conceptual Analysis of Masculinity in African Philosophy.

Joyline Gwara

Conversational School of Philosophy

University of Zimbabwe

“It is only males who are created directly by the gods and are given souls. Those who live rightly return to the stars, but those who are ‘cowards or [lead unrighteous lives] may with reason be supposed to have changed into the nature of women in the second generation’. This downward progress may continue through successive reincarnations unless reversed. In this situation, obviously it is only men who are complete human beings and can hope for ultimate fulfillment; the best a woman can hope for is to become a man” (Plato, Timaeus 90e).

Abstract

In this paper we challenge the perceived binary between reason and emotion, which has informed the purported binary opposites between women and men in philosophy. While emotion is ranked **higher** than reason, it is also seen as being antithetical to reason. In the same vein, because women have been associated with emotion and men associated with reason, the parallel view is that women are inferior and antithetical to men. In this way, the perceived difference between emotion and reason has become gendered, with regards to the understanding of the concept of male and female. To solve this problem, we seek to dismantle any perceived parallelism as lacking any merit, showing that the nature of, and relationship between, emotion and reason cannot be transported to our ideas about being male or female. Finally, we argue that the relationship between emotion and reason is a conversational one and that this conversation constitutes a psychological part of being both male and female – or rather, being human. Thus, avoiding the dichotomies that the earlier parallelism fosters.

³ See Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic (eds.), *Critical Whiteness Studies. Looking behind the Mirror*, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1997.

⁴ See Siseko Kumalo, ‘Explication Abjection – Historically White Universities creating Natives of Nowhere?’. *Critical Studies in Teaching & Learning* 6 (1), 2018, 1–17

⁵ See Jusuf Waghid, *African Philosophy of Education Reconsidered: On Being Human*. New York: Routledge, 2014.

Applying Conversational Thinking on the Problem of Xenophobia in Multicultural Societies

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Multicultural societies are faced with the problem of xenophobia – the fear, dislike, and discrimination against strangers. Xenophobia has its root in the ontology of ‘the self’ and ‘the other’, where “the self” is ‘the indigenes’ and ‘the other,’ ‘the strangers’, who must be denied the privileges and rights of the indigenes and the opportunity to contribute towards the development of their societies. In this paper, I employ conversational thinking – a method and philosophy grounded in the sub-Saharan African notion of ‘relationship’ as a viable theoretical option that can help us live beyond the problem of xenophobia. In conversational thinking, there are two ontological and epistemic agents, *nwa-nsa* and *nwa-nju*, involved in an *arumaristic* relationship at an ontological point, *nwa-izugbe*. I ground my argument in this ‘*arumaristic* relationship’ which allows for *nwa-nsa* taken as ‘the self’ (indigenes) and *nwa-nju*, ‘the other’ (strangers) to come to the realm of *nwa-izugbe*, and exhibit *nmeke* (complementarity and solidarity). I contend that the notion ‘*nmeke*’, emphasized in conversational thinking, is key to putting xenophobia in the past since it stresses ‘*arumaristic* complementary relationship’ irrespective of socio-cultural and racial differences among people.

An Application of Conversational Thinking to the Problem of Racial Discrimination in South Africa

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Abstract

The problem of racial discrimination in South Africa asks the question of who is to be included and excluded from the gains and discourses of South Africa society. South Africa society before the advent of democracy structurally and politically was built on exclusionary policies that are disadvantageous to those classified as blacks (natives), colored (mixed raced individuals) and Indians (South Africans of Indian descent) respectively. In order to unpack the nature of this racial discrimination, I will start by showing how the historical workings of Apartheid policies contribute to the continued problem of racial discrimination in South Africa. I argue that the problem of racial discrimination in present-day South Africa can best be analyzed from new perspectives motivated by the legacies of Apartheid. One of such new perspectives is lack of the orientation of mutual interdependence. I tap into conversational thinking to show that one veritable way of addressing this challenge would be to cultivate the

orientation of racial complementarity which is a basic idea in conversational thinking. Conversational thinking purveys a methodological disposition for managing the relationship of seemingly opposed variables like the racial lines in South Africa, making it possible for opposed variables to interact harmoniously and complement one another in ways that dispel unequal and discriminatory treatment of individuals within any society.

On the Distinction between Friedrich Hegel's Dialectics and the Logic of Conversational Thinking

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Abstract

Following the publication of Jonathan O. Chimakonam's *Ezumezu: A System of Logic for African Philosophy and Studies*, a monumental piece in the history of African philosophy and logic which also undergirds the backbone of conversational thinking, various misconceptions and uncharitable misrepresentation has greeted the work. Of the several misrepresentations, the tendency to treat the logic as an African version of Hegel's dialectics has become endemic. Being a three-valued logic, the tendency to perceive the third value 'e' in conversational thinking as a synthesis is replete in several commentaries and criticisms. This has almost become the norm since Hegel's third value, following thesis and anti-thesis signifies a synthesis. Through the method of philosophical analysis, I argue that: (1) the logic of conversational thinking is not similar to Hegel's dialectics hence, all commentaries and criticisms in this guise exhibit the Strawman; (2) for the logic that underlies conversational thinking, synthesis is an anathema; and (3) conversational thinking places emphasis on complementarity over contradiction. Following these points, I submit that when the veil of Hegel is cast aside, a deeper appreciation for a logic that mediates thinking for Africa and beyond may be better appreciated.

Applications of Conversational Thinking: The Role of Collective Action in Merging Contexts

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Abstract:

Conversationalism (Chimakonam, 2015; 2017) is based on the idea that the truth of our propositions depends on the context in which they are asserted and describes a process of

relational yet critical exchange between the epistemic agents of various propositions for the purpose of perpetual refinement. However, experiences in applying the conversational method in a micro intercultural setting show that when individuals who are engaged in this creative struggle take collective action together their contexts may in fact converge, thereby frustrating a continuous collision of theses. As a point of departure for this submission I take an auto-ethnographic approach and share my reflections on a series of conversational encounters between proponents of two religious/cultural traditions in Austria who were faced with the challenge of practically collaborating on an educational policy. I then draw on discourse theory to discuss the role of this unified action in producing contextual overlap and theoretical nearness without thwarting the goal of epistemic sophistication. This makes room for the possibility of a higher order or objective truth towards which nested and contextual ones gradually advance and has practical implications for macro intercultural engagements, such as those between Austrians (or Europeans) and their growing immigrant populations.

How can we Overcome the Problem of Conversationund in Applying Conversational Thinking?

Aribiah Attoe
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Abstract

In applying conversational thinking in a real-world context, there is the ever-present danger of conversationund, which basically describes the crossing of the *benoke* point in a conversational encounter, thereby *limiting* conversations through the collapse of contexts into a false synthesis. Conversationund is not so much a danger, as it is a temptation – the feeling being that this false synthesis implies progress and meaning-making. Furthermore, there is also the problem of mistaken identity, where observers and interlocutors mistake a collapse to the *nomo-point* or *nil-point*, to mean a collapse of contexts into a false synthesis. In this article, I show that crossing the benoke is possible and also reveal the problems associated with crossing the benoke point. I also show how the up-down movement of thought clarifies the possible misrepresentation of the nomo-point as a conversationund. I do this by, first analysing the benoke point and its place in conversational the dialectic. I, then, reveal the problem of conversationund, especially as it relates to crossing the benoke point and limiting conversations. Finally, I explain the up-down movement of thought and how the concept of the nomo-point thoroughly explains the collapse of a thesis (whether nwa nju or nwa nsa) in a way that avoids conversationund, and the misrepresentation of the nomo-point as conversationund.

Decolonising Method in the Age of Transdisciplinarity: A Case for Conversational Thinking

Isaiah Negedu
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Abstract

I will respond to two queries in this work. The first bothers on the possibility of having a single space in a transdisciplinary discourse. What will scholarship look like when we all come from our various vantage points? The second issue is a corollary of the first; will transcension of disciplines be another ploy of coloniality to create a special breed of recipe that privileges one group over others? Overall, I argue that transdisciplinarity as it stands is inadequate since it silently promotes the exclusion of some methods. I will call for conversational thinking that will serve as a model for others to speak meaningfully and be heard.

Transhumanism in Africa: A Conversation with Fayemi on his Afrofuturistic account of Personhood

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University of Johannesburg

Abstract

In *Personhood in a Transhumanist Context: An African Perspective*, Ademola K. Fayemi advocates for a kind of Afro-communitarian theory of transhumanism which involves bodily and moral enhancement, among others, by means of science and technology. He proposes that transhumanism is compatible with the Afro-communitarian normative idea of personhood. In this paper, I examine Fayemi's account of transhumanism, in particular, Afrofuturistic account of personhood. Against his Afrofuturistic account of personhood, I argue that enhancing personhood is more plausibly viewed as technologized personhood, and that even if such a technologized personhood contributes to common good, this would not support the moral permissibility of transhumanism from an Afro-communitarian standpoint. I will deploy Ifeanyi Menkiti's view to contend that such a technologized personhood would have a great implication for Afro-normative conception of personhood in the transhumanist future.

Ubuntu as Conversational: A Case of the Common Moral Position

Fainos Mangena, PhD
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University of Zimbabwe

Abstract

This article argues that Ubuntu as a philosophy and an ethic necessarily bears the traits of conversational thinking and that these traits are made manifest through the idea of the Common Moral Position (CMP), an Ubuntu moral imperative, which holds that the moral position of the majority of elders in a group carries the day. This article argues that if conversational philosophy is a philosophy that necessarily pits two central protagonists against each other, namely; the *nwanju* (inquirers) and the *nwasa* (respondents), then Ubuntu through the CMP bears the traits of conversational philosophy because the CMP is a result of moral conversations between and among elders in African communal settings, with a view to produce a common moral position tailor-made to guide and regulate the behavior of members of successive generations of Bantu peoples. The article notes that during these conversations, some elders ask critical questions, while others respond to these questions, and as this happens, disagreements on what should be considered as right or wrong behavior obviously ensue, but in the end the elders settle for a moral position which has the support of the majority, which is then packaged in proverbs, idioms and folktales as the CMP.

African Philosophy Beyond Eurocentric Concepts and Categories: A Conversational Discourse

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Abstract

Philosophy as philosophy could be said to have started when men began to wonder, and interrogate everything that exists. Man in all cultures and places have wondered about his existential realities. Even in the West, the origin of philosophy is associated with this wonder. Is it possible to say that men never wondered about their existential realities in Africa? Must the kind of wonder experienced by Africans be similar to that of the West? Why is African philosophy faced with the herculean task of proving its origin, nature, method and content? How necessary is the debate on the existence of African philosophy? Eurocentric concepts and categories have created what Chimakonam will call epistemic injustice to African philosophy. The debate between Ethno-philosophers and members of the universal school were largely influenced by European hegemony, which is coloured by politics of exclusion. In this paper, I contend that Eurocentric concepts and categories are not universal, as they only represent Western perspective and as such should not be used as a yardstick in assessing other world philosophies, especially African philosophy. Using the conversational method, I argue that African philosophy should not be tailored to conform or gain Western Eurocentric acceptability, rather should engage itself in global discourse.

Topic: Conversations with Kwasi Wiredu: why conceptual decolonization must adopt conversational thinking

Lindokhule Shabane

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Abstract

In this paper I seek to reinvigorate the theory of conceptual decolonization within African philosophy that has, over the years, succumbed to inertia. I argue that Wiredu's conceptual decolonization must be grounded on conversational thinking to avoid becoming obsolete. Conceptual decolonization is a double-pronged project with a negative and positive aspect. On the negative, it means using one's native language as a tool for a critical appraisal of the philosophical concepts one uses in order to dislodge any colonial concepts they may have been uncritically assimilated into our thought systems. On the positive side, it meant an engagement with concepts, ideas and theories from other philosophical traditions to ascertain whether they can, if necessary, be supplemented to one's tradition. The project has to contend with two important challenges. First, when one investigates a foreign concept in one's native language and finds it to be wanting, how does one know to whom the fault lies? Secondly, what happens when two cultures have two opposing theories about the same concept? Kwasi Wiredu's solution to the challenges was what he termed 'independent grounds'. In this paper I seek to offer a solution to the two challenges above. I agree that a part of the solution is 'independent grounds' as Kwasi Wiredu maintains. However, 'independent' grounds will truly be independent if grounded on the conversational concept of relationship called Arumaristics. I show how adopting the conversational theoretic framework avoids the pitfalls that previously made conceptual decolonization untenable and thus obsolete.

Conversational Ethical Principles as Roadmap to Good Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa

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Abstract

My aim in this paper is to develop some ethical principles from the perspective of conversational philosophy which can be used to produce a frame work that will usher in good governance in African polity. I argue that the problem of bad leadership and poor governance in Africa can, in some ways be attributed to the lack of enduring political values that rest on viable ethical principles. I will appropriate two of Jonathan Chimakonam's canons of conversational philosophy namely; 'non veneration of authorities' and 'critical engagement' in developing a framework for good governance in Africa. To do this, I will reformulate and elevate these two canons to the level of ethical principles and demonstrate how they can be good instruments in fashioning good governance in African continent.

DAY 1

Speaker	Topic	Time
Opening	Opening	8.45 – 9.00
Prof. C. K. Raju	Keynote: “Euclid” must fall: The “Pythagorean” “theorem” and the rant of racist and civilizational superiority	9.00 – 10.00
Yvette Freter	Philosophical (Mis)Appropriation: A philosopher of education considers the stealing, borrowing, sharing, and creating of African philosophy	10.05 – 10.35
Joyline Gwara	Reason and Emotion as Binaries in the Conceptual Analysis of Masculinity in African Philosophy.	10.40 – 11.10
Lucky Uchenna Ogbonnaya	Applying Conversational Thinking on the Problem of Xenophobia in Multicultural Societies	11.15 – 11.45
Break	Break	11.45 – 12.30
Diana Ekor	An Application of Conversational Thinking to the Problem of Racial Discrimination in South Africa	12.30 – 13.00
Emmanuel Ofuasia	On the Distinction between Friedrich Hegel’s Dialectics and the Logic of Conversational Thinking	13.05 – 13.35
Leyla Tavernaro-Haidaria	Applications of Conversational Thinking: The Role of Collective Action in Merging Contexts	13.40 – 14.10
Aribiah Attoe	How can we overcome the problem of Conversationund in applying Conversational Thinking	14.15 – 14.35

DAY 2

Speaker	Topic	Time
Isaiah Ngedu	Decolonising Method in the Age of Transdisciplinarity: A Case for Conversational Thinking	9.00 – 9.30
Amara Esther Chimakonam	Transhumanism in Africa: A Conversation with Fayemi on his Afrofuturistic account of Personhood	9.35 – 10.05
Fainos Mangena	Ubuntu as Conversational: A Case of the Common Moral Position	10.10 – 10.40
Uchenna Azubuikwe Ezeogu	African Philosophy Beyond Eurocentric Concepts and Categories: A Conversational Discourse	10.45 – 10.15
Break	Break	10.15 – 11.00
Lindokhule Shabane	Conversations with Kwasi Wiredu: why conceptual decolonization must adopt conversational thinking	11.00 – 11.30
Enyimba Maduka	Conversational Ethical Principles as Roadmap to Good Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa	11.35 – 12.05
Victor Nweke	A Conversation on the Keg and Trademark of Humanity	12.10 – 12.40
Christiana Idika	TBC	12.45 – 13.15

CLOSING	CLOSING	13.15 – 13.30
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